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County Welfare Department Liability for
Handling Reports of Child Abuse
A child may die from severe abuse between the time a county
welfare department receives a report of suspected abuse and the
time they investigate the report. If the social worker who receives
the report reasonably determines that the situation was non-ur-
gent, the county welfare department should not be held liable.
This Comment analyzes the four contexts in which a special rela-
tionship with a county welfare department may arise and con-
cludes that a duty of care should not be imposed upon county
welfare departments. Even if a duty of care is imposed, a county
welfare department, as a governmental agency, should be immune
from liability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Child abuse can result in death even after social workers receive
and investigate reports of abuse.' As a result of the agency's involve-
ment, a negligence claim may be brought against a county welfare
department.2 California recently faced this issue in Ebarb v. County
1. See Mark A. Uhlig, Preventing Child Abuse: When Early Hints Are Not
Enough, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1987, at B1 (study indicated that 25% to 50% of child
fatalities involved child abuse in families that had already been identified as high-risk
cases by child protective agencies); Douglas J. Besharov, Protecting Children from
Abuse: Should It Be a Legal Duty?, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 509, 510 (1986) (explaining
that 25% of child fatalities involved child abuse that had already been reported to a
child protective agency).
2. See cases cited infra notes 42, 51. State tort law is likely to be the basis for an
abused child's claim against a county welfare department. In Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Court held that the state had
no constitutional duty to protect a child from his father after receiving reports of possible
abuse. In Deshaney, the father beat his four-year-old child into a coma. Id. at 193. The
child's mother brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the agency and its social
workers, alleging that they deprived the child of his liberty in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. Id. The Supreme Court determined that nothing in the
due process clause requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citi-
zens against invasion by private actors. Id. at 195. The Court noted in dicta that the
state tort law may provide a remedy: "It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to
protect [the child] against a danger it concededly played no part in creating, the State
acquired a duty under state tort law to provide him with adequate protection against that
danger." Id. at 201-02. See also Laura H. Martin, Comment, Caseworker Liability for
the Negligent Handling of Child Abuse Reports, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 191 (1991) (dis-
cussing state tort law doctrines that determine a social worker's potential liability).
of Stanislaus, which involved the death of a three-year-old child af-
ter the welfare department had been alerted to the potential harm.3
However, the Ebarb decision was ordered not to be published. 4 Be-
cause of the pervasiveness of child abuse,5 California will likely
again confront the unresolved issue of the extent of the state's re-
sponsibility to protect children from abuse.
County welfare department liability depends on two related issues:
whether the county welfare department owes a duty of due care and,
if so, whether the county welfare department should be immune
from liability.6 The issues are difficult to resolve when the alleged
negligence involves a failure to act rather than the commission of a
harmful act. Because courts are traditionally reluctant to impose lia-
bility for nonfeasance rather than for misfeasance,7 courts impose an
affirmative duty to act only in certain circumstances, such as where
a special relationship exists between the parties.8
3. 246 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1988) (ordered not to be officially published, 254 Cal. Rptr.
508, 765 P.2d 940 (1988)). In Ebarb, the plaintiff called the county welfare department
and reported that his three-year-old girl was in imminent danger. Id. at 846. The plain-
tiff could not intervene because he was under a court order not to have contact with the
child. Id. The county welfare department did not take any action and the child died from
severe abuse. Id.
4. 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940 (1988).
5. In San Diego, 86,758 cases of child abuse and neglect were reported in 1990, a
206% increase from 1985. Jonathan Gaw, Study on Children Paints a Bleak Picture,
L.A. TimEs, Aug. 14, 1991, at B. In Orange County, 34,259 reports of child abuse or
neglect were reported in 1991, reflecting a 20% increase from 1990. Lynn Smith, When
Tough Times Hit Homes - Hard, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1992, at BI. In San Francisco,
reports of child abuse have increased by 400% in the past five years. Elaine Herseher,
'Kids' Amendment on the Ballot in SF: Prop. J Sets Aside Portion of City Budget, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 30, 1991, at A17.
6. The elements of negligence are the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty
which is the proximate cause of an injury, and an injury that is compensable with dam-
ages. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
164-65 (5th ed. 1984). Duty is recognized as the "threshold" element in a cause of action
for negligence. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 202, 649 P.2d 894, 896,
185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 254 (1982). If the issue of duty is resolved against the plaintiff, the
case is disposed of without reaching the issue of governmental immunity. Id. at 203, 649
P.2d at 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
7. The distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance has deep roots in the com-
mon law and may have been based on early courts' concern with aggressive misconduct
rather than failures to aid, however egregious the failure. See Francis H. Bohlen, The
Moral.Duty to Aid Others As a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908).
The distinction may owe its survival to the difficulty of setting manageable standards for
an expanded duty to protect. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1982).
8. Generally, a person does not have an affirmative duty to assist or protect an-
other who is in danger. Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 23, 664 P.2d 137, 139, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 235 (1983). One exception to the no-duty rule is the special relationship doc-
trine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315-320 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT];
Davidson, 32 Cal. 3d at 203, 649 P.2d at 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 255 (citing RESTATE-
MENT, supra, § 315; Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 751-52, 614 P.2d
728, 733-34, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75-76 (1980); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17
Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976)). There are other
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This Comment examines both the duty issue and the immunity
issue and concludes against county welfare department liability when
a social worker receives a complaint of child abuse and determines
that the situation is non-urgent. Part II analyzes the four basic con-
texts in which a special relationship may arise in a county welfare
department setting. This part proposes that a duty of care should not
arise based on the special relationship doctrine. Part III focuses upon
the potential for immunity for social workers and county welfare de-
partments under California's Tort Claims Act. This part suggests
that even if a duty is imposed, the county welfare department should
be immune from liability.
II. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION TO THE No-DUTY-
TO-RESCUE RULE
To maintain a negligence action against a county welfare depart-
ment, the plaintiff must show that the county welfare department
had a duty to protect the child.9 If there is no express statutory duty
to protect abused children, then common law tort principles may be
applied to determine whether the county welfare department owes a
duty of care.10 A general rule under the common law is that a person
has no legal duty to protect another." This rule derives from the
exceptions to the general no-duty rule. A person is liable for failing to act if he or she
created the harm. Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 23, 664 P.2d at 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
This exception is not applicable here because a county welfare department receiving a
report of suspected child abuse probably did not create the harm. A person is liable for
failing to act if he or she volunteers to come to the aid of another and his or her failure
to exercise care increases the risk of harm or the harm is suffered because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking. Id., (citing RESTATEMENT, supra, § 323). This exception,
which is referred to as the "good Samaritan" doctrine, applies when a person has no
initial duty to act. Id. The question here is whether a county welfare department has an
initial duty to act. However, cases applying the special relationship doctrine in this con-
text analyze the plaintiff's reliance. See infra part II.C.
9. See supra note 6.
10. See Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 23, 664 P.2d at 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 235; David-
son, 32 Cal. 3d at 203, 649 P.2d at 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at
751, 614 P.2d at 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
11. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 314, which states: "The fact that the actor real-
izes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection
does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." A famous case for this
principle is Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1898). In Buch, the'
owner of a mill was found to have no duty to a trespassing eight-year-old child who
caught his hand in machinery and was severely injured. The court clearly stated the no-
duty-to-rescue rule:
Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on the track,
and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to
himself, and the instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he
common law's distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. 12 If
a court characterizes the defendant's behavior as nonfeasance, ab-
sent an exception imposing a duty, the defendant ordinarily will owe
no duty to the plaintiff. The no-duty-to-rescue rule has been sup-
ported 3 as well as criticized. 4
There are exceptions to the general no-duty-to-rescue rule. In such
cases, liability may be imposed even where the defendant's passive
behavior would not have been otherwise actionable. A duty may
arise where a special relationship exists,' 5 where a person created the
may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is
not liable in damages for the child's injury, or indictable under statute for its
death.
Id. at 260, 44 A. at 810. Other severe cases demonstrating this principle are Handiboe v.
McCarthy, 114 Ga. App. 541, 151 S.E.2d 905 (1966) (no liability for the failure of
defendant's servant to rescue a four-year-old child from a swimming pool filled with
three feet of water); Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959) (no liability
when defendant urged business invitee to jump into drainage ditch and failed to rescue
the invitee from drowning).
12. Misfeasance is active misconduct causing actual injury to others for which one
may be liable. Nonfeasance is a failure to take steps to protect others from harm, Le., the
nonperformance of some act, for which tort law has been more reluctant to recognize
liability. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 56, at 373. The distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance has two fundamental problems: "(1) in many cases it is impossible to
distinguish the two; and, (2) in cases where intuitively there is a clear distinction, that
distinction does not always coincide with generally accepted notions about whether liabil-
ity should attach." John M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some
Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or
Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 867, 878 (1991).
13. Courts have supported the no-duty-to-rescue rule by refusing to impose liabil-
ity for failure to act even when the failure is egregious. See cases cited supra note 11.
For commentators' support of the no-duty-to rescue rule, see Martin B. Rosenberg, The
Alternative of Reward and Praise: The Case Against a Duty to Rescue, 19 COLUMI, J.L,
& Soc. PRoBs. 1 (1985) (opposing the expansion of a duty to affirmatively aid or protect
as an inappropriate use of legal sanctions to enforce moral obligations); Richard A. Ep-
stein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 200-01 (1973) (arguing that
to impose a duty to aid or protect on an "innocent" bystander would be unfair and would
violate fundamental notions of individual liberty); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1049 (1956) (the no-duty-to-rescue rule promotes the abstract
aim of protecting individualistic values by refusing to legally require unselfishness).
14. Courts have not directly rejected the common law rule, but have expanded the
special relationship doctrine to find exceptions to the rule. See infra note 18 and accom-
panying text. For commentators' criticism of the no-duty-to rescue rule, see Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 258-68 (1980) (provides a
detailed analysis of the limits of nonfeasance justifications and defends the consideration
of moral values in decision-making); James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L.
REV. 97, 111-13 (1908) (proposes that liability be imposed upon one who causes the
death or serious injury of another by failing to undertake a rescue, but only where rescue
was "with little or no inconvenience" to the rescuer); Aleksander W. Rudzinski, The
Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 91
(James M. Ratcliff ed., 1981) (discussing that the duty to rescue has been imposed in
European countries).
15. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 30: 187. 1993] County Welfare Department Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
risk initially (even if non-negligently),' 16 or where a person has be-
come involved by virtue of taking initial, gratuitous steps to help."
In an increasing number of cases, courts have relied upon the spe-
cial relationship doctrine to find exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue
rule. 8 The special relationship doctrine provides that a duty arises if:
"(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives the other a right to protection."' 9 Thus, there are
two types of affirmative duties under the special relationship doc-
trine: a duty to "control" and a duty to "protect.
20
16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 321, 322. The law recognizes that even if there
is no other relationship between the parties, a risk-creator has a duty to provide reasona-
ble aid or protection to one put in danger. See id. Courts sometimes analyze this situa-
tion as one creating a relationship. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d
352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). See infra text accompanying notes 91-94 for a discussion
of the Johnson decision.
17. RESTATEMENT. supra note 8, § 324. Even where a defendant has done nothing
to create a risk and has no special relationship with either the victim or the assailant, a
duty may be found where the defendant has taken steps to assist the person in need. Id.
18. Of the nearly 200 reported state appellate decisions between 1945 and 1991
citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 314 (1934) and RESTATEMENT, supra note
8, § 314, only 3 were decided before 1962. Roughly 20 cases each year have made refer-
ence to the section between the mid-1980s and 1991. Adler, supra note 12, at 877 n.41.
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 315; Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 788 n.5, 710 P.2d 907, 911 n.5, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840, 844 n.5 (1985)
(quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 894, 898, 185
Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982)). Under the first theory, the question is whether a special
relation exists between the county welfare department and the assailant. See Davidson,
32 Cal. 3d at 205, 649 P.2d at 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256. Under the second theory, the
question is whether a special relation exists between the county welfare department and
the child. See id. at 206, 649 P.2d at 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256. This Comment does not
address the issue of whether the parent who contacted the county welfare department
could be considered a "victim." In Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.
1987), a child who was in his father's custody died of starvation and malnutrition after
the mother reported the abuse to the child protective agency. The court noted that it
could be argued that the mother was the "victim." Id. at 667 n.5.
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 315 states that, in essence, the duty is identical
in either case: "to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing
physical harm to another." However, what is deemed a special relationship for the impo-
sition of the duty to control is not necessarily a special relationship with respect to a duty
to protect. For example, a common carrier has a duty to protect its passengers but there
is no corresponding duty to exercise control over their actions. Lopez, 40 Cal. 3d at 791,
710 P.2d at 914, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 847. This dichotomy of duties to protect and to
control may be a consequence of the particular defendant's prior position as a protector
or a controller. See James P. Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts,
30 DE PAUL L. REV. 147, 169-72 (1980). Or the dichotomy may be used as necessary to
reach decisions grounded in traditional tort law theory. See generally Adler, supra note
The special relationship doctrine is not new. Initially, courts sim-
ply held that the duty to control or to protect was present in certain
relationships, such as the relationship of parents to their children,
employers to their employees, and innkeepers to their guests.2 1 Some
courts have expanded the types of relationships that would give rise
to a duty. 2 For example, psychotherapists have been held responsi-
ble for failing to exercise reasonable care to protect others from dan-
gerous patients.23 Expansion of the types of relationships that would
give rise to a duty often "involve public institutions, businesses, or
professionals who have failed to protect an injured individual from
the person who most 'directly' caused the harm."24 Despite such ex-
pansions, some courts have declined to impose a duty even where a
special relationship existed.
25
The question then is when does a special relationship arise and
when is such a relationship sufficient to impose liability. The general
definition of a special relationship does not provide guidance as to
when a special relationship arises .2  Examining the attributes which
special relationships have in common indicates four contexts in
which a special relationship may arise. First, a special relationship
may arise by statute.27 Second, a special relationship may arise when
the defendant has some special knowledge or responsibility. Third,
12 (arguing that courts distort the no-duty-to-rescue rules in order to impose upon de-
fendants an obligation to act reasonably under the circumstances-the same duty pre-
scribed in any negligence action).
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 316-319. The Restatement also lists other rela-
tionships, such as a master to his servant, a custodian to a dangerous charge, and a
carrier to a passenger which were also subject to a duty.
22. Some courts have at times found a legal duty in situations where there would
have been no duty found under the early common law. Adler, supra note 12, at 877
(citing Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976) as an example). In
Farwell, the Michigan Supreme Court found that a teenager had a duty to aid a friend
who had been beaten while the boys were on a social venture. 396 Mich. at 287, 240
N.W.2d at.222.
23. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976). See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Tarasoff decision.
24. Adler, supra note 12, at 868. These cases appear to be concerned not only with
issues of safety, but with loss distribution as well. Id. at 868 n.7. Litigation provides an
avenue for an injured party to recover through the tort system when the most obvious
defendant is not a likely source of recovery. Id. Additionally, assailants are not always
capable of paying a judgment, even when they can be apprehended. Id.
25. See, e.g., Thompson v. Alameda County, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167
Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980). See infra note 94 for a discussion of the Thompson decision.
26. In essence, a special relationship is defined as a relationship giving rise to a
duty of due care. Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 23, 664 P.2d 137, 139, 192 Cal. Rptr.
233, 235 (1983). This definition is, of course, circular.
27. See Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907,
221 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985) (special relationship exists between carriers and passengers
based on a statute which provides that common carriers must do everything necessary for
their passengers safe carriage).
28. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (special
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a special relationship may arise when the defendant causes another
to justifiably rely on him or her to the other's detriment.2 9 Fourth, a
special relationship may arise when there is a relationship of depen-
dency between the parties.3 0 Although this model has limitations,
31 it
provides a useful framework for analysis.
To apply these principles to a county welfare department it must
first be determined whether the county welfare department's conduct
can be characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance. Because the
county welfare department confers a benefit, the conduct will proba-
bly be considered nonfeasance.32 As such, a plaintiff's case will fail
unless it can be shown that an exception to the no-duty-to-rescue
rule should apply. Applying the special relationship exception3 3 leads
relationship based on a psychiatrist's knowledge existed when psychiatrist failed to warn
a woman of danger posed by patient); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (special relationship based on state's responsibility existed when
state failed to warn foster parents of the dangerous tendencies of a youth placed in their
home).
29. See Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508
(1964) (special relationship based on reliance existed when sheriff promised to warn
threatened woman of the release of a particular prisoner).
30. See Mann v. State, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977) (special
relationship based on dependence existed when police officer stopped to investigate
stranded motorist on freeway who was subsequently injured). The dependence context as
applied by Mann is uncertain. See infra part II.D.
31. The biggest limitation is that courts are guided by unarticulated policy con-
cerns. See Adler, supra note 12, at 897 (discussing that, in affirmative duty decisions,
courts actually impose upon defendants an obligation to act reasonably under the circum-
stances); Shlomo Twerski, Note, Affirmative Duty After Tarasoff, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1013 (discussing that careful policy analysis is notably absent in the affirmative duty
decisions). Policy considerations play a vital role in the judicial recognition of legal du-
ties. "'[D]uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled
to protection." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
76 (1968) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964)).
The ultimate question is whether a duty should be imposed as a matter of policy. 3
HARPER ET AL, supra note 13, § 18.6. "[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of
nature but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability
should be imposed for damage done." Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d
425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976).
Another limitation is that these contexts are not discrete and separate. In a situation
where two or more contexts are present, a court is more likely to impose a duty. See, e.g.,
Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 840 (1985) (the court relied on both a statute and a relation of dependence and
control in holding that common carriers have a special relationship with passengers
which imposes a duty on the carriers to protect passengers from assaults). See infra notes
72-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lopez decision.
32. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 8 for an explanation of the inapplicability of the other excep-
tions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule.
to the question of whether a special relationship existed between the
county welfare department and the assailant or between the county
welfare department and the abused child. This question will be ana-
lyzed in the four contexts in which a special relationship may arise.
A. Special Relationship Based on a Child Abuse Statute
A statute may provide a source of duty either expressly or by cre-
ating a special relationship.3 4 However, a generalized duty to the
public cannot be the basis of a negligence claim in the absence of a
special relationship between a public entity and a specific individ-
ual.35 Thus, the relevant question is whether the child abuse statute
creates a special relationship between the county welfare department
and the abused child.
The California Legislature responded to the problem of child
abuse by enacting statutes that delegate the responsibility of receiv-
ing child abuse reports to county welfare departments.36 Child abuse
statutes have two main clauses: the purpose clause and the proce-
dural clause. The purpose clause of the child abuse statute reveals
the legislative intent and can be used as persuasive authority to con-
tend that the statute created a duty for the county welfare depart-
ment to protect abused children. 37 The procedural clause of the child
34. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d
948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989); Lopez v. Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985).
35. This doctrine is called the public duty doctrine. See generally CHARLES S.
RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 32.9 (1980) (explaining the
distinction between a special and private duty). An illustration of the public duty doc-
trine follows. A police officer owes a duty to the general public as a whole to protect the
citizenry. Von Batsch v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 111 I, 1121, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 239, 244 (1985).
A person does not, by becoming a police officer, insulate himself from any of
the basic duties which everyone owes to other people, but neither does he as-
sume any greater obligation to others individually. The only additional duty
undertaken by accepting employment as a police officer is the duty owed to
the public at large.
Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 24 n.3, 664 P.2d 137, 140 n.3, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 236
n.3 (quoting Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. App. 1981)). Absent a
special relationship creating a special duty, a claim based solely on the public duty will
fail. See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 252 (1982); Von Batsch, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 1122, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 245; Hartz-
ler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975).
36. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16000-16515 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
37. E.g., Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d
258, 261, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 354, 357 (Fla. 1988). In Yamuni, the court found that the
Florida child protection agency's duty to protect abused children was reinforced by the
statement of legislative intent that child abuse reports prevent further harm to the child.
Id. The purpose clause of the Florida child abuse statute states that the prevention of
child abuse shall be a priority of the state because of the increasing problem of child
abuse and its impact on children and their families. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(1) (West
1986 & Supp. 1990).
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abuse statute contains the procedures that the country welfare de-
partment must follow.38 A social worker must make an "immediate
in-person response ... in emergency situations .... However, an in-
person response is not required when the county welfare department,
based upon an evaluation of risk, determines that an in-person re-
sponse is not appropriate."39
Because the California courts have yet to address whether the
child abuse statute creates a special relationship, 0 arguments from
other states may be persuasive.4 . Some state courts have held that
the state child abuse statute did not create a duty to protect a specif-
ically identified abused child.42 For example, in M.H. v. State,43 the
The California child abuse statute states that the purposes of county welfare services
are:
(a) protecting and promoting the welfare of all children including handicapped,
homeless, dependent, or neglected children; (b) preventing or remedying, or
assisting in the solution of problems which may result in, the neglect, abuse,
exploitation, or delinquency of children; (c) preventing the unnecessary separa-
tion of children from their families by identifying family problems, assisting
families in resolving their problems, and preventing breakup of the family
where the prevention of child removal is desirable and possible; (d) restoring to
their families children who have been removed, by the provision of services to
the child and the families; (e) identifying children to be placed in suitable
adoptive homes, in cases where restoration to the biological family is not possi-
ble or appropriate; and (f) assuring adequate care of children away from their
homes, in cases where the child cannot be returned home or cannot be placed
for adoption.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
38. California Welfare and Institutions Code § 16504 provides:
Any child reported to the county welfare department to be endangered by
abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall be eligible for initial intake and evaluation
of risk services. Each county welfare department shall maintain and operate a
24-hour response system. An immediate in-person response shall be made by a
county welfare department social worker in emergency situations in accordance
with regulations of the department. The person making any initial response to
a request for child welfare services shall consider providing appropriate social
services to maintain the child safely in his or her own home. However, an in-
person response is not required when the county welfare department, based
upon an evaluation of risk, determines that an in-person response is not appro-
priate. An evaluation of risk includes collateral contacts, a review of previous
referrals, and other relevant information, as indicated.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16504 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
39. Id.
40. This was the issue in Ebarb v. County of Stanislaus, 246 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1988)
(ordered not to be officially published, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940 (1988)).
41. It should be noted that some state opinions refer to "special duty" instead of
"special relationship."
42. M.H. v. State, 385 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1986); Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F.
Supp. 602, 611 (W.D. Mo. 1982), a.f'd sub nom. Nelson v. Missouri Div. of Family
Servs., 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983). In some cases the existence of a special relationship
depended on whether the claim was against the social worker or the agency. See Jensen
Iowa Supreme Court held that the Iowa child abuse statute did not
create such a duty.," The court acknowledged the conflicting obliga-
tions that caseworkers undertake and the potential negative impact
the imposition of a duty could create." The Iowa statute, like Cali-
fornia's child abuse statute,46 facilitates removing children from abu-
sive environments and returning children to their home as soon as
practicable.47 The Iowa court determined that exposure to liability
would place social workers in precarious situations and inhibit vigor-
ous decision-making.
48
In Nelson v. Freeman, a federal district court similarly held that
the Missouri child abuse statute did not create a special duty.49 The
court stated that a social worker had a public duty to investigate
once a child abuse report was received; however, a claim based only
on a generalized duty to the public does not create a special
relationship. 50
Other state courts have held that a child abuse statute does create
a duty of care."' In Brodie v. Summit County Children Services
v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 297 S.C. 323, 328, 377 S.E.2d 102, 106-07
(S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that no special relationship existed between the state em-
ployees and the abused child but the child abuse statute created a special duty upon
social worker to conduct a thorough investigation of child abuse reports); Coleman v.
Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 191, 366 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1988) (holding that city did not owe
abused child special duty, but because abused children were within class that was in-
tended to be protected by child abuse statute, violation of statute could give rise to negli-
gence claim against social worker); MidAmerica Trust Co. v. Moffat, 158 I11. App. 3d
372, 379, 511 N.E.2d 964, 970 (1987) (court dismissed complaint against social worker
but indicated that the agency would be a more appropriate defendant).
43. 385 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1986).
44. Id. at 537.
45. Id.
46. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
47. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.67 (West 1985).
48. 385 N.W.2d at 537-38. The court reasoned that by enacting the child abuse
statute, the legislature did not intend to create a tort cause of action against the state or
its employees for the negligent performance of their duties. Id. The Iowa court analo-
gized a social worker's duties to that of a police officer's. "Their judgment will not al-
ways be right; but to assure continued vigorous police work, those charged with that duty
should not be liable for mere negligence." Id. (citing Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299,
301 (Iowa 1982)).
49. Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602, 611 (W.D. Mo. 1982), affd sub nom.
Nelson v. Missouri Div. of Family Servs., 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
50. Under Missouri law, the public duty doctrine prevents the translation of a pub-
lic duty into a special duty. Id. See supra note 35 for an explanation of the public duty
doctrine.
51. See, e.g., Brodie v. Summit County Children Servs. Bd., 51 Ohio St. 3d 112,
119, 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1308 (1990) (holding that state child abuse statute created a
special relationship giving rise to a duty to protect a specific child after a report was
received); Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 667 (D.C. 1987); Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258, 261, 13 Fla. L. Weekly
354 (Fla. 1988) (holding that, under Florida statute, state child protection agency had
special duty to prevent future harm to abused children); Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528,
531, 675 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that state agency had duty to
protect specific child under Arizona child abuse statute when it received child abuse
196
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Board,52 the court held that the Ohio child abuse statute created a
duty to protect a specific child after a report was received. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court applied a four-part test to determine
whether the special relationship existed: (1) the municipality must
have assumed an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the abused
child, (2) knowledge must have existed on the part of the municipali-
tiy's agents that inaction could lead to harm, (3) the abused child
must have justifiably relied on the municipality's undertaking, (4)
direct contact must have existed between the caseworker and the
abused child.53 To meet the first element, the court reasoned that the
statute required caseworkers to investigate child abuse reports and
report their findings. 4
Brodie should be unpersuasive in California for two reasons. First,
Ohio's four-part test requires all four elements to be met before a
special relationship is imposed. In contrast, California has four sepa-
rate contexts in which a special relationship may arise.55 Second,
Ohio's child abuse statute requires social workers to investigate all
reports of known or suspected child abuse within twenty-four
hours. 6 In contrast, California's child abuse statute allows the social
worker to decide whether to investigate a report. 7
In Turner v. District of Columbia,58 a child died of starvation and
reports); Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19, 26 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (holding that police regulations gave rise to a special duty once the vic-
tims were clearly and specifically identified); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1192
(Utah 1989) (dicta) (holding that Utah child abuse statute created duty to protect chil-
dren who were identified as child abuse victims).
52. 51 Ohio St. 3d 112, 554 N.E.2d 1301 (1990).
53. Id. at 118-119, 554 N.E.2d at 1308.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. A special relationship in Cali-
fornia can be imposed based only on the statute; there is no need for the county welfare
department to know that harm will follow, no need for a child's justifiable reliance, and
no need for direct contact with the county welfare department and child.
56. The relevant portion of the Ohio child abuse statute provides:
The county department of human services or children services board shall in-
vestigate, within twenty-four hours, each report of known or suspected child
abuse or child neglect and of a known or suspected threat of child abuse or
child neglect that is referred to it under this section to determine the circum-
stances surrounding the injuries, abuse, or neglect or the threat of injury,
abuse, or neglect, the cause of the injuries, abuse, neglect, or threat, and the
person or persons responsible.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(F)(1) (Baldwin 1992).
57. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16504 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); see supra
notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
58. 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987).
malnutrition after the child protective service agency received nu-
merous reports of child abuse.59 The court held that a special duty
may be created either by statute or by direct contact and justifiable
reliance.60 The court determined that the District of Columbia Child
Abuse Prevention Act created such a duty.61
The Turner court relied on an Arizona decision, Mammo v
State,"2 and a Florida decision, Florida First National Bank v. City
of Jacksonville.63 In both Mammo and Florida First National, the
court held that a special duty was created by statute. The Turner
court found Mammo and Florida First National persuasive. In each
case, the governmental agency had been notified of the situation sev-
eral times, the information received had the same level of reliability,
the agency was required by law to take prompt action, and the Ari-
zona and Florida statutes were very similar to the District of Colum-
bia's act. 4
The Turner court, however, declined to follow the contrary deci-
sion of Nelson v. Freeman.65 The Turner court distinguished Nelson
on its facts, noting that in Nelson, the government agency had the
opportunity to evaluate the abused children. The California child
abuse statute, like the Missouri child abuse statute, gives the social
worker the discretion to decide whether an investigation is war-
ranted.66 Thus, the California child abuse statute should not be con-
strued to create a special relationship between county welfare
departments and abused children.
In Ebarb v. County of Stanislaus,6 7 which was ordered not to be
59. Id.
60. Id. at 667. A statute or regulation could describe a special duty if its language
sets forth mandatory acts aimed at a particular class of persons rather than the public at
large. Id. The children did not have direct or continuing contact with the county welfare
department. Id. Thus, appellants argued that once a specific report of abuse or neglect is
filed, a special relationship exists between the county welfare department and the identi-
fied child because the statute requires that certain actions be taken. Id.
61. Id. The court found the duty to be narrow and specific, created by statute to
benefit a precisely defined class of persons, neglected and abused children. Id. at 673.
62. 138 Ariz. 528, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). In Mammo, a wrongful
death action was brought against the State of Arizona and its Department of Economic
Security for failing to act promptly on a complaint that children were being abused. The
court held that a special duty arose between the victims and the agency when the agency
received information concerning the threatened child. Id. at 531, 675 P.2d at 1350. It
emphasized that Arizona's child protection statute established specific duties on the part
of the protection services workers which were clearly for the benefit of a particular
group. Id. at 532, 675 P.2d at 1351.
63. 310 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In Florida First Nat'l, the court held
that police regulations gave rise to a special duty once the victims were clearly and spe-
cifically identifed. Id. at 26.
64. Turner, 532 A.2d at 670.
65. 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982); see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying
text.
66. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
67. 246 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1988) (ordered not to be officially published, 254 Cal.
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published, the court held *that California Welfare and Institutions
Code sections 16501.1 and 16504 created a special relationship be-
tween county welfare departments and abused children. 68 At the
time of the.events in Ebarb, section 16501.1 required social workers
to make an "immediate in-person response, 24 hours a day, seven
days a week to reports of abuse, neglect, or exploitation."6 In 1987,
after the Ebarb events occurred, section 16501.1 was amended.
70
The word "immediate" was deleted and portions were added stating
that an "in-person response is not required when the county welfare
department, based upon an assessment, determines that an in-person
response is not appropriate.
' '71
At the time of the events in Ebarb, the California child abuse stat-
ute was similar to the Ohio, Arizona, Florida, and District of Colum-
bia child abuse statutes which all required immediate investigation
of all reports. However, the amended California child abuse statute
does not require immediate investigation and gives the social worker
the discretion to decide whether an investigation is warranted.
In California, there are recognized special relationships created by
statute that establish an affirmative duty to act. In Lopez v. South-
ern California Rapid Transit District,2 the court held that a statute
created a special relationship between a common carrier and a pas-
senger which gave rise to a duty to protect passengers from injury by
fellow passengers. a The plaintiffs were fare-paying passengers on
board a bus when a "violent argument" ensued. 4 The bus driver was
notified of the "altercation" but continued to operate the bus without
Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940 (1988)); see supra note 3 for a discussion of Ebarb's facts.
68. Id. at 849.
69. Section 16501.1 was enacted in 1983, amended in 1987, and repealed in 1991.
The events in Ebarb took place before the 1987 amendment. Before the 1987 amend-
ment, § 16501.1 provided:
Preplacement Preventive-Services are those services which are designed to help
children remain with their families by preventing or eliminating the need for
removal.
(a) The Emergency Response Program is a component of Preplacement Pre-
ventive Services and is a response system which provides immediate in-person
response, 24 hours a day, seven days a week to reports of abuse, neglect, or
exploitation, for the purpose of providing initial intake services and crisis inter-
vention to maintain the child safely in his or her own home or to protect the
safety of the child.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 40 Cal. 3d 780, 710 P.2d 907, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985).
73. Id. at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
74. Id. at 784, 710 P.2d at 908, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
taking any precautionary measures.7 5 The argument escalated into a
violent fight and the plaintiffs were injured.76
The Lopez court relied on California Civil Code section 2100
which provides that common carriers "must use the utmost care and
diligence for their [passengers'] safe carriage, must provide every-
thing necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a
reasonable degree of skill." 77 In contrast, Welfare and Institutions
Code sections 16504 and 16501 do not impose such stringent re-
quirements on social workers as Civil Code section 2100 imposes on
common carriers. County welfare departments are established to
serve several goals, including the protection of children. 7 These stat-
utes, however, do not require county welfare departments to do "eve-
rything necessary" to protect children. The statute provides county
welfare departments with guidelines in determining how to respond
to a report of suspected child abuse.
Furthermore, the Lopez court relied upon the relation of depen-
dence and control between a carrier and its passengers in order to
impose a duty.79 Passengers must rely on the bus driver for their
safety because they are "sealed in a moving steel cocoon."80 The
"means of entering and exiting are limited and under exclusive con-
trol of the bus driver."'" In contrast, county welfare departments do
not have such exclusive contact with or control over the environment
of a child when they have received a call of suspected child abuse.
Unlike the relationship between carriers and their passengers, there
is no relation of dependence or control between a child and a county
welfare department when a social worker first receives a report of
suspected child abuse.
In Bonds v. California ex reL California Highway Patrol,82 a
highway patrolman did not remove a parked, abandoned Ford Mus-
tang from the side of a highway.8 3 Later, plaintiff's U-Haul truck
collided with a motor home, which had apparently stopped to either
repair or remove the Ford Mustang. 4 The force of the collision
caused the motor home to collide with the Ford Mustang, causing an
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. California Civil Code § 2100 provides: "A carrier of persons for reward must
use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything neces-
sary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill." CAL.
Civ CODE § 2100 (West 1985).
78. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
79. 40 Cal. 3d at 789, 710 P.2d at 912, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 138 Cal. App. 3d 314, 187 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1982).
83. Id. at 317, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
84. Id. at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
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explosion that killed two passengers in the motor home.8 5 Relying on
California Vehicle Code section 22651, which "permits" rather than
"requires" a highway patrolman to remove a vehicle from a high-
way,86 the court found that the highway patrolman did not owe a
duty of care to the plaintiff.8
Like the highway patrol, a county welfare department is'subject to
statutory rules and duties. Social workers have a duty to make an in-
person visit immediately upon the report of child abuse only when
they determine that an emergency situation exists. 8 Because an in-
person response is not required for each report of child abuse but is
predicated on a social worker's decision that an emergency situation
exists, a duty of care to protect a child should not arise before any
contact with the child.
Both the purpose clause and the procedural clause of the Califor-
nia child abuse statute are similar to other states' child abuse stat-
utes which have not given rise to a special relationship. First, the
purpose clause states that the county welfare department's goals are
to remove children from abusive environments and return children to
their home as soon as practicable. Exposure to liability would place
social workers in precarious situations and inhibit vigorous decision-
making. Second, the procedural clause does not mandate an immedi-
ate response and gives social workers the discretion to decide
whether a report must be investigated. Furthermore, the California
child abuse statute is more like the discretionary statute in Bonds
than the mandatory statute in Lopez. Consequently, the county wel-
fare department should not have a special relationship with a child
based on the child abuse statute.
B. Special Relationship Based on Special Knowledge or
Responsibility
Another context where a special relationship may arise is when
the defendant has some special knowledge or responsibility toward
another.8 9 The special relationship may invoke a duty to control an-
other person's conduct or to protect an identifiable and foreseeable
85. Id.
86. California Vehicle Code § 22651 states in pertinent part: "Any peace officer..
may remove a vehicle... (b) When any vehicle is left standing upon a highway... in
a condition so as to create a hazard to other traffic ... CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651
(West Supp. 1992).
87. Bonds, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 321, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16504 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
89. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
third party from harm. 0
In Johnson v. State,91 a parole agent placed a juvenile parolee
with violent tendencies into the Johnson's home without warning
them of his potentially dangerous behavior. 92 The juvenile attacked
and injured Mrs. Johnson.93 Because the parole agent knew of the
juvenile's violent tendencies, a failure to warn the Johnsons placed
them in foreseeable danger and thus created a special relationship
between the state and the Johnsons. 94
A county welfare department may have no prior dealings with an
assailant. If so, then the county welfare department has no knowl-
edge of an. assailant's temperament or tendencies, violent or other-
wise. Unlike the situation in Johnson, a social worker probably did
not introduce the assailant into the household. Nor would a social
worker's actions or inactions place a child in any greater risk of dan-
ger than before the report of abuse was made.
In Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,95 the court
held that the plaintiffs could state a claim against a psychiatrist for
failing to protect their daughter, an identifiable victim, from an as-
sailant who had threatened her life.96 A duty to warn the victim of
the danger was imposed on the psychiatrist, in part because of his
special relationship to the assailant.97 The relationship of psychiatrist
and patient fosters open dialogue between a psychiatrist and his pa-
tient. Therefore, a psychiatrist should have the access to information,
training, and skill necessary to discern a patient's serious threats of
violence. 98
In most cases, an alleged assailant is essentially a stranger to the
90. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 784-85, 447 P.2d at 354, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
93. Id. at 785, 447 P.2d at 354, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
94. Id. at 785-86, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243. But see Thompson v.
Alameda County, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980). In Thomp-
son, a juvenile offender was released from a county institution to the custody of his
mother without warning her of his threat to kill an unspecified young child. Id. at 746,
614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The juvenile murdered -the plaintiffs' young child
within twenty-four hours of his release. Id. The court distinguished Tarasoffs duty to
warn because Tarasoff had involved a named or readily identifiable victim. Id. at 752-56,
614 P.2d at 733-37, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76-79. The court also justified the absence of duty
on the public policy grounds of effective operation of a parole system. Id. at 756-57, 614
P.2d at 737, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
95. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
96. Id.
97. The court also based its decision upon a determination that society's interest in
confidentiality must be subordinated to an interest in public safety. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d
at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The court concluded that the therapeutic relationship with
the assailant was sufficiently "special" to justify the creation of a new exception to the
general no-duty rule in nonfeasance situations. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 23.
98. The court compared the role of the psychiatrist to that of a physician who
must often make predictions based upon evaluations. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131
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county welfare department social worker. There is no dialogue be-
tween them, no sharing of violent or secret thoughts. However, a
trained social worker may have special knowledge about child abuse
and therefore may have the special knowledge and responsibility re-
quired to impose a special relationship.
In Tarasoff, the court concluded that the campus police who
briefly detained the assailant did not have a special relationship with
the assailant or the victim.99 Although the court did not explain its
conclusion, a possible rationale is that it was not foreseeable to cam-
pus police that the patient would still kill the victim. Like the cam-
pus police in Tarasoff, a county welfare department is informed that
an assailant might present a danger to a child. If a county welfare
department cannot foresee imminent danger to a child, then a spe-
cial relationship between an assailant and the county welfare depart-
ment should not be imposed.
In Davidson v. City of Westminster,'"0 the plaintiff was stabbed in
a laundromat that police officers had under surveillance.' The
plaintiff asserted that a special relationship existed between the of-
ficers and the assailant based on the officers' status as policemen and
their recognition of the assailant as a dangerous person. 02 The court
held that mere proximity to an assailant even with knowledge of his
assaultive tendencies was too tenuous a connection to impose a spe-
cial relationship.1
0 3
In most situations, the connection between a social worker and a
potential assailant is less than the connection in Davidson. First, a
social worker has no physical proximity to a potential assailant. Sec-
ond, a social worker is unlikely to recognize an assailant. Finally, the
social worker probably does not have knowledge of the assailant's
tendencies. If this was the first report about a potential assailant, a
social worker may have determined that the potential assailant was
not dangerous.0 As such, the connection between the social worker
Cal. Rptr. at 25. The psychiatrist need only exercise a reasonable degree of skill, knowl-
edge, and care in determining whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence. Id.
99. Id. at 432, 444, 551 P.2d at 341, 349, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21, 29.
100. 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982).
101. Id. at 201, 649 P.2d at 895, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
102. Id. at 205, 649 P.2d at 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
103. Id.
104. A social worker who receives a complaint of suspected child abuse evaluates
the risk to the child. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16504 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
Responses to a complaint of suspected child abuse include immediate in-person response
or no in-person response. Id. If the social worker did not respond immediately, then the
social worker may have determined that an in-person response was not required. If so,
203
and the potential assailant is too attenuated, and therefore, a special
relationship should not be imposed.
A plaintiff may assert that a special relationship based on special
knowledge exists. The strength of a claim that a special relationship
exists between the county welfare department and the abused child
may depend on the extent of the contact between the county welfare
department and the child. If the plaintiff asserts that a special rela-
tionship exists between the county welfare department and the as-
sailant, the claim is unlikely to prevail because the connection
between the county welfare department and an assailant is minimal.
C. Special Relationship Based on Reliance
A third situation in which a special relationship may arise is
where the defendant causes another to justifiably rely on him or her
to the other's detriment.' As noted earlier, in Davidson v. City of
Westminster,0 8 the plaintiff was stabbed in a laundromat that the
police officers had under surveillance. 10 7 The plaintiff asserted that a
special relationship existed between the police officers and herself be-
cause of her dependence upon the police officers to secure her
safety.108 The court held that a special relationship did not arise be-
tween the police officers and the plaintiff even though the plaintiff
was a potential victim of a potential assailant. 09
When a county welfare department receives a report of suspected
child abuse, the child could be characterized as a potential victim of
a potential assailant. However, the child's status as a potential victim
should not be sufficient to give rise to a special relationship. The
county welfare department may have been aware of the danger that
an assailant posed to the child, but the county welfare department's
failure to protect the child placed the child in no worse position than
he or she would have been otherwise." 0
then the social worker probably considered the potential assailant as not dangerous.
105. See supra note 29.
106. 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982); see supra notes
100-03 and accompanying text.
107. 32 Cal. 3d at 201, 649 P.2d at 895, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
108. Id. at 206, 649 P.2d at 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256. The plaintiff alleged that
two special relationships existed: a special relationship between police officers and the
assailant which gave rise to a duty to control the assailant and a special relationship
between police officers and herself which gave rise to a duty to protect her. Id. at 205-06,
649 P.2d at 898-99, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256-57. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the
special relationship existed between the plaintiff and the officers because of the decision
to conduct surveillance, the observation of the potential assailant in the laundromat
where the plaintiff was present, and the recognition of the assailant as the likely perpe-
trator of a previous assault. Id. at 206, 649 P.2d at 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
109. Id. at 208-09, 649 P.2d at 900, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
110. A similar argument was made in Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In declinifig to find a constitutional violation by the
state, the majority in DeShaney concluded that the state might have been aware of a
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In Von Batsch v. American District Telegraph Co.,"' police of-
ficers responded to a burglar alarm, failed to check the roof, and a
few hours later the home's occupant was murdered at the hands of
intruders."l 2 Even though the officers reported that there were no in-
truders on the premises, a special relationship between the officers
and the decedent was not imposed."' The court noted that respond-
ing to an alarm and investigating the premises did not make the of-
ficers responsible for the occupant's safety." 4
Similarly, social workers respond to reports that indicate that a
person may be at risk. County welfare departments, like police de-
partments, deal each day with many potential victims at risk. Be-
cause of limited resources, these agencies must assign priorities
among these risks. A social worker may make a reasonable decision
not to respond immediately to a call of suspected child abuse. The
social worker's response, like the response in Von Batsch, should not
be considered tantamount to insuring a child's safety.
D. Special Relationship Based on Dependence
A fourth context in which a special relationship may arise is
where there is dependency or mutual dependency between persons." 15
In Mann v. State, a special relationship was imposed due to the de-
pendency between a motorist and a California Highway Patrol-
man." In Mann, a motorist was injured when the patrolman left the
stranded motorist without lighting protective flares or without wait-
ing until a tow truck could effectively protect the person. 117 Because
the patrolman was an "expert in traffic safety" the plaintiff did not
act to protect himself but relied on the patrolman having taken all
steps necessary to protect him from passing cars on the highway." 8
A child probably depends on those he or she knows and loves to
danger that a child's father posed to the child, but argued that the state's failure to
protect placed the child in no worse position than he would have been otherwise. Id. at
201.
111. 175 Cal. App. 3d 1111, 222 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1985).
112. Id. at 1116-17, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
113. Id. at 1125, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
114. Id.
115. Mann v. State, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 779-80, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (1977).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 777, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
118. Id. at 780, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
protect him or her from harm rather than depend on the county wel-
fare department. Although at some point a child may come to de-
pend on the county welfare department for protection, the
dependence standard as applied by the court in Mann remains un-
certain. The California Legislature attempted to overrule Mann by
enacting California Government Code section 820.25 as an urgency
measure in 1979.119 Furthermore, in Williams v. State,120 the court
characterized Mann as an application of the good Samaritan rule.
121
A good Samaritan is one who voluntarily comes to the aid of an-
other. 2 2 As such, 'the doctrine does not pertain to whether the
county welfare department has an initial duty to protect abused chil-
dren.12 3 The Williams court also concluded that a requisite factor in
119. California Government Code § 820.25 provides:
(a) For purposes of Section 820.2, the decision of a peace officer ... or a state
or local law enforcement official, to render assistance to a motorist who has not
been involved in an accident or to leave the scene after rendering assistance,
upon learning of a reasonably apparent emergency requiring his immediate at-
tention elsewhere or upon instructions from a superior to assume duties else-
where, shall be deemed an exercise of discretion.
(b) The provision in subdivision (a) shall not apply if the act or omission oc-
curred pursuant to the performance of a ministerial duty. For purposes of this
section, "ministerial duty" is defined as a plain and mandatory duty involving
the execution of a set task and to be performed without the exercise of
discretion.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.25 (West 1980). This section was apparently enacted due to the
concern that officers might be found liable for leaving one scene and going to another just
as urgent. Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 25 n.5, 664 P.2d 137, 141 n.5, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 237 n.5 (1983).
120. 34 Cal. 3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1983).
121. Id. at 26, 664 P.2d at 141, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 237. In Williams, the plaintiff
was a passenger in a moving automobile when a piece of heated brake drum from a
passing truck flew through the windshield of the car and struck her in the face, causing
severe injuries including the loss of one eye. Id. at 21-22, 33, 664 P.2d at 138, 146, 192
Cal. Rptr. at 234, 242. The California Highway Patrol officers arrived within minutes
and investigated the accident. Id. at 21, 664 P.2d at 138, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 234. The
police failed to pursue the truck, thus destroying plaintiff's opportunity to obtain compen-
sation for her injuries. Id. at 21-22, 664 P.2d at 138, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 234. In examining
the duty issue, the court applied the general rule that there is no duty to aid others, but
that a good Samaritan who does so voluntarily assumes a duty to exercise due care in
that aid. Id. at 23, 664 P.2d at 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 235. Specifically, a good Samari-
tan may only be found liable "if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
[the] harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertak-
ing." Id. at 23, 664 P.2d at 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36. The court concluded that a
patrol officer who comes to the aid of an injured or stranded motorist is a good Samari-
tan and should be held only to that standard of care. See id. at 26, 664 P.2d at 141, 192
Cal. Rptr. at 237.
The special relationship doctrine does not define what circumstances constitute suffi-
cient dependence to justify a special relationship finding. In fact, one factor cited in
Williams as showing that a relationship of dependence arose was that "it was reasonably
foreseeable that plaintiff would rely on [the officer's] expertise." Id. at 33, 664 P.2d at
147, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (Bird, J., dissenting). This mention of reliance illustrates the
confusion that may result in determining dependence.
122. Id. at 23, 664 P.2d at 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
123. The question here is whether a county welfare department has an initial duty.
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finding a special relationship is detrimental reliance by the plaintiff;
mere dependence is insufficient. 124 Thus, it is unclear whether depen-
dence alone is sufficient to impose a special relationship.
Analyzing the four contexts in which a special relationship may
arise reveals that a special relationship should not be imposed when
a social worker receives a complaint of child abuse and determines
that the situation is non-urgent. First, a special relationship may be
created by statute. However, the California child abuse statute is
similar to statutes that have not created a special relationship. A
special relationship may also arise if the defendant has some special
knowledge or responsibility, if the plaintiff detrimentally relies on
the defendant, or if there is a relationship of dependence between the
parties. Whether any of these three contexts is sufficient to find a
special relationship depends greatly on the closeness of the contact
between the county welfare department and the child or the assail-
ant. If the relationship between the county welfare department and
the child is attenuated, then a special relationship should not be im-
posed regardless of whether the child is a foieseeable victim. Addi-
tionally, in most instances the relationship between the county
welfare department and the assailant will be too minimal to impose a
special relationship.
124. Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 25, 664 P.2d at 141, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court
reached this conclusion while examining the possibility that there was a special relation-
ship between the motorist and the patrol officers. Id. at 23-27, 664 P.2d at 139-43, 192
Cal. Rptr. at 235-38. The court analyzed Mann and two irreconcilable cases. In Winkel-
man v. City of Sunnyvale, 59 Cal. App. 3d 509, 130 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1976), a truck that
caused two cars to collide left the scene. The truck driver went to the police station to
report that he may have been a participant in an accident. The police at the station were
not liable for allowing the truck driver to leave the police station without obtaining his
identity. In Clemente v. State, 101 Cal. App. 3d 374, 161 Cat. Rptr. 799 (1980), a
pedestrian was struck by a motorcyclist. The officer who stopped to investigate was liable
for failing to secure the motorcyclist's name. In reaching its conclusion, the Williams
court overruled Clemente, which had found a special relationship based only on depen-
dence. Williams, 34 Cal. 3d at 28 n.9, 664 P.2d at 143 n.9, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.9.
The Williams court reaffirmed its earlier judgment that Mann, which had also found a
special relationship based on dependence, was simply an application of the good Samari-
tan doctrine. Id. at 26, 664 P.2d at 141, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court also distin-
guished Mann from Williams, finding that in Mann the officer was liable for failing to
protect the plaintiff from future physical harm, as opposed to Williams, in which the
officer allegedly failed to investigate the cause of harm already incurred. Id.
207
III. IMMUNITY
If a duty is imposed on a county welfare department, the issue of
governmental immunity arises.126 The duties and immunities of gov-
ernmental entities are closely related, and it is difficult to separate
them into distinct categories.12 The two issues raise similar policy
considerations which require a balancing between an entity's unique
powers and an entity's potential liability for the consequences of exe-
cuting those powers. 127 Nonetheless, some courts have separated the
two issues into the "duty horse" and "immunity cart."' 28
In California, the liabilities and immunities of public employees
have been specifically outlined by the legislature in the California
Tort Claims Act.12 9 Because social workers are public employees,
125. See supra note 6.
126. Whether a court finds that a governmental entity has no duty or is immune
from liability, the result is the same: the governmental entity is not liable for allegedly
negligent conduct. See McCarthy v. Frost, 33 Cal. App. 3d 872, 109 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1973); Bratt v. San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 550, 123 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1975). In
McCarthy and Bratt, the court characterized an act or omission as an immune discre-
tionary function when the same result could be reached by holding that the defendant
did not owe a duty of care. Another example of the relatedness of the two issues is when
a court assumes that a special relationhip obviates the need to consider whether the gov-
ernmental entity is immune from liability. See Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App.
3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975); Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance, 39 Cal. App. 3d
588, 114 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1975); McCarthy v. Frost, 33 Cal. App. 3d 872, 109 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1973).
127. Both issues provide important limitations on governmental liability. Courts
"have invoked the concept of duty to limit generally 'the otherwise potentially infinite
liability which would follow every negligent act.'" Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27
Cal. 3d 741, 750, 614 P.2d 728, 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (1980) (quoting Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968)). Courts
apply immunity to assure
judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions
has been committed to coordinate branches of government. Any wider judicial
review . . . would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the
propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of govern-
ment. Moreover, the potentiality of such review might even in the first instance
affect the coordinate body's decision-making process.
Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1551, 1560, 266 Cal. Rptr. 682, 687
(1990) (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr.
240, 248 (1968)). See also Lisa McCabe, Comment, Police Officers' Duty to Rescue or
Aid: Are They Only Good Samaritans?, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 661 (1984) (discussing argu-
ments for and against governmental duty and immunity).
128. "'Conceptually, the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does
not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the
plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.'" Williams v. State,
34 Cal. 3d 18, 22, 664 P.2d 137, 139, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 235 (1983) (quoting Davidson
v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 201-02, 649 P.2d 894, 896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252,
254 (1982)). The question of " 'duty' is only a threshold issue, beyond which remain the
immunity barriers." Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal. App. 3d 698, 706, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 189, 193 (1977).
129. The California Tort Claims Act is contained in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-
895.8 (West 1980). The California Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1963 and superseded
common law rules on sovereign immunity. Id. § 810 (Historical Note).
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statutory governmental immunity may be applied to their negligent
acts or omissions as a basis for limiting governmental tort liability. 30
This Part proposes that, even if a duty is imposed on a county wel-
fare department, the California Government Code should provide
immunity from liability.
A welfare department's potential liability will hinge on whether
the social worker who handled the case engaged in a discretionary
act."3' A mechanical analysis of the term "discretionary" has been
rejected in favor of evaluating those policy considerations which un-
derlie grants of immunity to determine which acts are protected.
3 2
A basic policy decision is a decision that is "expressly entrusted" to
an agency by statute.
133
An example of a discretionary act is the selection of custodians for
potentially dangerous minors.'" In Thompson v. County of Ala-
meda, 35 a juvenile offender was released from a county institution to
the custody of his mother without warning her of his threat to kill an
unidentified young child. 36 The juvenile murdered the plaintiffs'
young child within twenty-four hours of his release. 3 7 Because the
130. All tort liability of public entities is constitutional ot statutory in origin. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980) (Legislative Committee Comment-Senate). California
Government Code § 815.2(b) shields a public entity from liability "for an injury result-
ing from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is
immune from liability." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2(b) (West 1980). Thus, a county wel-
fare department will be immune from liability if the social worker is immune from
liability.
131. California Government Code § 820.2 provides: "Except as otherwise provided
by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission
where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him,
whether or not such discretion be abused." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980).
132. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788, 447 P.2d 352, 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
245 (1968).
133. See id. at 788, 447 P.2d at 356-57, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45. The Johnson
case has been consistently used by courts for interpreting whether an act is discretionary
under California Government Code § 820.2. See Mouchette v. Board of Educ., 217 Cal.
App. 3d 303, 312, 266 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1990); Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 793, 710 P.2d 907, 915, 221 Cal. Rptr. 840, 848 (1985); Thomp-
son v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 614 P.2d 728, 731, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70,
73 (1980); Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 18 Cal. 3d 406, 414-15, 556 P.2d 764, 768-
69, 134 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406-07 (1976).
134. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 747, 614 P.2d at 731, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 73. The
court dismissed the plaintiffs' action, deciding that the county's decision to release the
juvenile, its selection of his custodian, and its supervision of her activities were statutorily
immunized from liability. Id.
135. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
136. Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The complaint alleged that
the county was aware of the juvenile's tendency to assault young children and of an
actual threat he had made to take the life of an unspecified young child. Id.
137. Id.
selection of custodians for potentially dangerous minors requires
comparisons, choices, judgments, and evaluations, it comprises the
very essence of the exercise of "discretion" and is immunized under
section 820.2.138
Similarly, dealing with reports of suspected child abuse requires
comparisons, choices, judgments, and evaluations. Social workers
must balance the rights of parents with those of their children.
13
9
This task is as difficult as it is delicate. A social worker's decision,
then, is the type of basic .policy decision that the Government Code
seeks to insulate from liability in section 820.2..
In Newton v. County of Napa,40 the court held that "[c]ounty
welfare department officials ...are immune from liability for the
decision to conduct an in-person response to an emergency situa-
tion."' 41 In Newton, the defendant received a call of suspected child
abuse and determined that an emergency situation existed.'42 The
social worker's decision was immune under section 820.2 because it
was a basic policy decision that was "expressly entrusted" to county
welfare departments by Welfare and Institutions Code section
16504.143
Social workers are guided in their decision-making by California
Welfare and Institutions Code section 16504, which requires an in-
person investigation if, based on an "evaluation of risk" the social
worker determines that an emergency situation exists that warrants
an in-person investigation of a child abuse report.4 Because the de-
cision-making process is granted discretionary immunity, a decision
not to investigate deserves the same discretionary immunity status as
the social worker's decision to investigate in Newton. It is irrelevant
if the decision results in a child's death, for if "discretion was exer-
cised ... the conduct cannot result in liability even though another
person, acting equally reasonably, might have handled the situation
differently.' ' 45 Thus, a social worker's decision whether an emer-
138. Id. at 748-49, 614 P.2d at 731-32, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74.
139. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
140. 217 Cal. App. 3d 1551, 266 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1990).
141. Id. at 1560, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
142. Id. at 1556, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
143. Id. at 1560, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
144. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16504 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
145. Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 30, 664 P.2d 137, 144, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233,
240 (1983) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
No matter which of the several alternatives [a social worker] selected, someone
could persuasively argue that another [course of action was appropriate]. This
scenario lends itself to the typical Monday-morning quarterbacking. It is for
just such a circumstance that the Legislature provided immunity when discre-
tion of a public employee is involved.
Id. The notion of a jury second-guessing every social worker's decision with the benefit of
hindsight may be a signficant factor in providing immunity.
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gency situation exists should be immune when the social worker
makes a considered decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
County welfare department liability depends on two related issues:
whether the county welfare department owes a duty of due care and,
if so, whether the county Welfare department should be immune
from liability. Generally, a person has no duty to assist or protect
another who is in danger. A duty may arise, however, if a special
relationship exists between the county welfare department and the
assailant or between the county welfare department and the abused
child.
A special relationship may arise in four contexts. First, a special
relationship may be created by statute. Analyzing the California
child abuse statute indicates that the statute should not create a spe-
cial relationship because it is similar to other states' statutes that
have not created a special relationship. Furthermore, the California
child abuse statute is similar to other California statutes which have
not given rise to a duty. A special relationship may arise in three
additional contexts: when the defendant has some special knowledge
or responsibility, when the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the de-
fendant, or when there is a relationship of dependence between the
parties. Analyzing the circumstances where a special relationship has
been found by California courts demonstrates that a special relation-
ship should not exist when a social worker receives a complaint of
child abuse and determines that the situation is non-urgent.
Even if a duty of care is imposed on a county welfare department,
the social worker should be immune from liability because the social
worker's decision that the situation is non-urgent is discretionary.
Because social workers should be immune from liability for their dis-
cretionary acts, the employer, the county welfare department, should
likewise be immune.
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